

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/PV.198  
14 July 1964  
ENGLISH

---

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND NINETY-EIGHTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Tuesday, 14 July 1964, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. M. LACHS

(Poland)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A. CORREA do LAGO

Mr. E. HOSANNAH

Bulgaria:

Mr. C. LUKANOV

Mr. G. GHELEV

Mr. T. DAMIANOV

Mr. I. BOEV

Burma:

U SAIN BWA

U HTOON SHEIN

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS

Mr. R.M. TAIT

Mr. P.D. LEE

Mr. C.J. MARSHALL

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. V. PECHOTA

Mr. V. VAJNAR

Mr. J. CHMELA

Ethiopia:

Lij Mikael IMRU

Ato S. TEFERRA

India:

Mr. R.K. NEHRU

Mr. K.P. LUKOSE

Mr. K. NARENDRANATH

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI

Mr. E. GUIDOTTI

Mr. S. AVETTA

Mr. G.P. TOZZOLI

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Mexico:

Mr. A. GOMEZ ROBLEDO

Mr. M. TELLO

Mr. J. MERCADO

Nigeria:

Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. LACHS

Mr. E. STANIEWSKI

Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI

Romania:

Mr. V. DUMITRESCU

Mr. E. GLASER

Mr. I. IACOB

Mr. V. CONSTANTINESCU

Sweden:

Mrs. A. MYRDAL

Mr. P. HAMMARSKJOLD

Mr. B. VEGESACK

Union of Soviet Socialist  
Republics:

Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN

Mr. L.I. MENDELYEVICH

Mr. S.A. BOGOMOLOV

Mr. I.M. PALENYKH

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A.F. HASSAN

Mr. A. OSMAN

Mr. M. KASSEM

Mr. A.A. SALAM

United Kingdom:

Sir Paul MASON

Mr. J.G. TAHOURLIN

Mr. J.M. EDES

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United States of America:

Mr. C.H. TIMBERLAKE

Mr. D.S. MACDONALD

Mr. R.A. MARTIN

Miss M.R. de GUNZBURG

Special Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Special Representative  
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Poland): I declare open the one hundred and ninety-eighth meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Before we proceed with today's agenda, I should like to read to you a report I have received from the two co-Chairmen. It is as follows:

"Under instructions from the Committee, the co-Chairmen have worked during the past week on the development of an agreed basis for the working group, the question of the creation of which arose in connexion with the current discussion in plenary meetings of the elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles in the process of general and complete disarmament. They have not as yet reached agreement. They are continuing their discussions and will report the results to an early meeting of the Conference."

I have one other comment to make at this point. This morning I have pleasure in welcoming Mrs. Myrdal back to our Committee. I think I shall be expressing the feelings of the Committee when I say that we are very glad she has come back to continue working with us on our difficult and important task.

Mr. LUKANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from Russian): First of all, permit me to join you, Mr. Chairman, in welcoming Mrs. Myrdal upon her return to our midst, and to wish her success in her work as leader of the Swedish delegation.

To begin with, I am bound to express our delegation's regret that the co-Chairmen have been unable to report to today's meeting the successful accomplishment of the task assigned to them. Nevertheless, their report mentions that they are continuing their efforts, and all that we can do is to wish them speedy success in this regard.

Since the discussion on the point in question is continuing, our delegation would like to make some comments, in the light of the statements made by a number of delegations at recent meetings, on the proposal to proceed to the consideration in detail, in an appropriate working body, of the practical questions arising from the concept of a "nuclear umbrella".

(Mr. Lukanov, Bulgaria)

However, before stating the views of our delegation on the terms of reference of the working group, I think it would be useful to recall once more how and why it became possible to reach the present stage in our negotiations, a stage which, it is generally agreed, has opened up possibilities for passing on to businesslike, practical work. There is no doubt that this became possible solely as a result of the endeavours of the Soviet Union to bring the positions of the sides closer together. I should not have taken up this matter if the representative of Italy, in analysing at our meeting of 7 July the development of the negotiations on the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles since 1962, had not described the facts and stages of these negotiations in such a sketchy manner (ENDC/PV.196, p.12). Mr. Cavalletti passed too quickly and without transition from the discussion of 1962 to the present discussion on the subject of a working group.

Yet it is precisely this transition, from the general debate on the question of eliminating nuclear weapon delivery vehicles on the basis of the Soviet draft treaty of 15 March 1962 (ENDC/2) and the United States outline of 18 April 1962 (ENDC/30) to discussion in a working group, that is of vital significance for our work. In order to reach the phase where the question could arise of passing on to a businesslike, practical consideration of the problem of eliminating nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, it was obviously necessary to seek for a new, mutually-acceptable basis that would make it possible to bring the positions of the sides closer together in order to overcome the deadlock.

This new mutually-acceptable basis was found and given concrete shape by the Soviet Union (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1). This new mutually-acceptable basis allows for and takes into account the views and misgivings of the Western countries, as well as the point of view of a number of social and political leaders and scientists who have studied these problems. In other words, if the Committee is now on the threshold of setting up a working group -- that is, if there is a possibility of proceeding to the consideration of practical details, including the technical aspects of the problem of eliminating nuclear weapon delivery vehicles -- it is the result of efforts to bring the points of view closer together and to find a mutually-acceptable basis for negotiations. Such efforts were exerted precisely -- and I regret to say -- only by the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries.

(Mr. Lukanov, Bulgaria)

Be that as it may, the "nuclear umbrella" proposal made by the Soviet Union in order to bring the positions closer together opened up new possibilities for solving the crucial question of the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. This proposal, this move of good will, gave rise to a wide exchange of views and a lengthy discussion and, in the end, led us to the threshold of a working body, the establishment of which we are now discussing.

This idea was very aptly and, in our opinion, very convincingly expressed by the representative of India when he stated at our meeting on 24 March:

"We in the Disarmament Committee are thus negotiating the implementation of a very important means to the ultimate objective of mankind, and it is necessary to view our efforts from that criterion. It is in that context, therefore, that the Indian delegation views the significant proposal made by Mr. Gromyko (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1) for a reduction and eventual elimination of the nuclear menace."

(ENDC/PV.177, p.27)

In explaining his idea, the representative of India went on to say at the same meeting:

"The Gromyko proposal envisages a substantial reduction of the existing nuclear arms potential in the world in the initial stage of the actual process of disarmament, and the maintenance of a balance of nuclear security with the retention under control by the United States and the Soviet Union of a strictly limited number of agreed types of missiles until the end of disarmament." (ibid., p.28)

It seems to us that in order to assess correctly our present discussion on the question of the terms of reference of the working group, as well as to assess the importance of the efforts made by the socialist countries to bring about a radical change in the negotiations on general and complete disarmament, it is worth while to recall also the observation made by the representative of Nigeria, Mr. Obi, who said on 23 June:

"... there is now, thanks to Mr. Gromyko's latest significant and far-reaching amendment, a point of intersection -- a focus. In a sense we now have a sort of lower limit, a rough area of agreement relatively nearer to the starting point of disarmament than the one we set out with in March 1962." (ENDC/PV.192, p.18)

(Mr. Lukanov, Bulgaria)

Mr. Obi's sound opinion, and particularly his clear statement that his delegation "sees no difficulty in approving the substance of the Gromyko proposal or indeed of even a more radical plan" (ibid., p.17), were also supported, as we know, by the representative of Mexico, Mr. Robledo, on 7 July (ENDC/PV.196, p.7).

In fact, the last very significant and far-reaching proposal of the Soviet Union (ENDC/PV.188, p.17) has opened up new possibilities for rapid progress in our work and has made it possible to consider in the Committee the question of passing on to the discussion, in an appropriate working body, of the specific problems arising from a definite concept, the "nuclear umbrella" concept, which is in itself -- and we should like to stress this -- a compromise between the original positions of the sides on the question of the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. As was stressed by the representative of Ethiopia, Mr. Imru, at the meeting on 30 June:

"... this concept" -- the concept of a minimum nuclear deterrent during the disarmament process -- "now enjoys a wide measure of acceptance in the Committee, and we hope that a closer examination in a business-like working group will yield further results." (ENDC/PV.194, p.28)

The Bulgarian delegation is convinced that everyone appreciates the great efforts which have been made in seeking for a solution to the question of the basis for the working group and which, we hope, will continue to be made by the delegations of the non-aligned countries in the Committee. These efforts, together with those of the socialist countries, have so far failed to yield any positive results because the delegations of the Western Powers have not shown the same desire to search for a mutually-acceptable basis for the activities of the working group.

One cannot help noting that the statements made by a number of Western representatives at the 194th and 196th meetings of the Committee showed that their approach to the question of the basis for the activities of the working group differs substantially from the predominating point of view in our Committee. The explanations given by certain Western delegations at the 196th meeting confirmed the misgivings that the establishment of a working body without an agreed basis and without a clear and well-defined directive would not only be useless but might even become a

(Mr. Lukanov, Bulgaria)

convenient pretext for reverting, in fact, to futile general discussions, to the starting-point of our negotiations in 1962, and at the same time might create deceptive and dangerous illusions about some sort of progress in the negotiations.

The tasks and terms of reference of the working group as described by certain Western delegations at the 196th meeting enable us to perceive even now the futility of the working group's activities if it were to be established and began its work on the basis proposed by the Western delegations. As you rightly pointed out, Mr. Chairman, the very large programme of work -- almost encyclopaedic -- suggested by certain delegations contradicts the very concept of a working group and "such a programme for a working group is a contradiction in terms" (ENDC/PV.196, p.27). There are good reasons for asking what, for instance, would be the composition of such a working group, and would it not soon become necessary to divide it up into numerous sub-groups? As a result of the lack of a clear and specific basis for its work, would it not turn out to be merely a replica of our discussions in the Committee, complicated by numerous details and technical points? In this regard we fully share the position of Mr. Nehru, who pointed out on 30 June:

"The working group must, however, know what precisely we have in mind.

It must have a clear directive, or clear terms of reference. Otherwise the course of discussion will follow the same general course as the discussion in the main Conference." (ENDC/PV.194, p.11)

What do we think we can and ought to do, if we really desire to record progress in our work? As is quite evident from our recent discussions, the predominating opinion in the Committee in regard to the terms of reference of the working group is that it is necessary to lay down such a basis for its activities as would preclude the possibility of general and endless discussions as to what is the purpose of our work, what is the main direction of this work. In other words, it is necessary to establish a working body which would be able to discuss as quickly as possible any specific problems connected with the implementation of the concept which some call a "minimum deterrent" or a "nuclear umbrella".

(Mr. Lukanov, Bulgaria)

Any vagueness, any ambiguity regarding the terms of reference of the working group which would make it possible to deviate from a fixed starting point would involve the risk of leading us into another impasse. The statement made by Mr. Foster at the 194th meeting and the statement made by Mr. Timberlake at the 196th meeting still further strengthen our conviction of the need for complete clarity in formulating the terms of reference of the working group. Mr. Timberlake, repeating what Mr. Foster had said and likewise disagreeing with the opinion of a number of delegations that the level of nuclear weapons is far above the minimum necessary for genuine security or as a deterrent, declared:

"In the case of the United States that deterrent represents the minimum necessary for its security." (ENDC/PV.196, p.25)

Such statements confirm that when some Western delegations assert that they too contemplate a "nuclear umbrella", as Mr. Foster did on 16 June (ENDC/PV.190, p.48) they really contemplate something altogether different, which is very remote from the principle of equal conditions of security on which the "nuclear umbrella" proposal is based. That is why we believe that any formulation of the terms of reference of the working group which would make it possible in any degree to have in view such a starting point as, for instance, Mr. Timberlake's minimum", or the "lower numbers" mentioned by Mr. Thomas on 30 June (ENDC/PV.194, p.23), would be likely to do more harm than good for our future work.

That is the reason why there should be a uniform approach to the question of the working group's terms of reference, a common and clearly-defined mutually-acceptable basis. The establishment of a working group will have sense and be a real, positive contribution to our negotiations only if the activities of the working group are based on the adoption by all the countries concerned of definite positions of principle, on the basis of which it will be possible to find concrete technical solutions for all the problems that arise in connexion with the adoption of these positions of principle.

In this regard very clear explanations, which we should bear in mind, were given by the representative of the Soviet Union on 30 June. Mr. Zorin said:

(Mr. Lukanov, Bulgaria)

"The essence of the Gromyko proposal is that it lays down a definite principle for the solution of the problem: a minimum deterrent, or so-called 'nuclear umbrella', would be retained and all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles would be eliminated in the shortest possible time in the first stage of disarmament. What this 'umbrella' should be, its characteristics, its expression in terms of quantity, the phases of its elimination, its control and so on are matters we are prepared to discuss." (ibid., p.33).

On 7 July the United States representative declared that --

"... there does seem to be a possibility of agreement on terms of reference, and we for our part will do everything possible to achieve such agreement." (ENDC/PV.196, p.25).

The representative of Italy, Mr. Cavalletti, in his turn, said that all delegations -

"... must actively contribute to this work, for the success of which ...

goodwill and a conciliatory spirit are quite indispensable." (ibid., p.16).

If one bears in mind the position of the delegations of the Western Powers on the question of the terms of reference of the working group, it is difficult to avoid the impression that it is precisely on the Western side that these necessary elements -- goodwill and a spirit of compromise -- have so far been lacking.

The representatives of Italy and Canada have stressed that the Western Powers do not claim a monopoly of wisdom. But in this case the delegations of the Western Powers do not appear to be following this rule in practice. One has only to study the arguments put forward recently by the Western delegations extolling the advantages of the "percentage approach", as expressed in the United States plan, in order to see that the Western Powers are in fact very close to holding the view that this plan, and particularly the approach which it proposes for the solution of the problem of eliminating nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, is a paragon of wisdom and that the only compromise which could have any value and could be accepted by the West is nothing more or less than the adoption of this approach. It is necessary not only to appeal for goodwill and a spirit of compromise, but also to show in deeds that these dispositions exist in all the parties.

(Mr. Lukanov, Bulgaria)

At the present time there is a possibility of taking an important step forward if we accept in principle the concept of a "nuclear umbrella" and if, on that basis, we proceed to a detailed discussion of the relevant practical questions. As many delegations have pointed out, negotiation means accepting the reasonable and constructive proposals of the other side, a willingness to accept them for the sake of the common interests. The Soviet Union and the other socialist countries have shown such willingness and have put forward proposals the substance of which -- and I should like to stress this once again -- is a compromise in regard to the original positions of the sides on the question of eliminating nuclear weapon delivery vehicles.

I have to mention this once more, simply because certain Western delegations are again putting forward objections alleging that the adoption in principle of the concept of a "nuclear umbrella" as the basis for the activities of the working group would be tantamount to adopting as the basis the proposals of only one side. It has been shown convincingly enough during our discussions that that is not so. It is time the West abandoned the tactic of rejecting reasonable and constructive proposals merely because they are put forward by the Soviet side. Such a tactic in regard to a proposal which is accepted in principle by the majority of mankind seems to us particularly inadmissible.

In his very interesting statement on 7 July the representative of Mexico, Mr. Robledo, convincingly expressed the hopes of millions of human beings, of all the peoples of the world, who, as he said, wish to be freed from the nuclear menace. Mr. Robledo also stressed that the security of the peoples "depends more on the destruction of all nuclear weapons than on the retention of such a minimum." (ENDC/PV.196, p.7). This has been and remains the immutable point of view of the socialist States. This point of view has been eloquently confirmed on many occasions by the Head of the Soviet Government, Mr. Khrushchev, who has stated that the Soviet Union is prepared to sink all its missiles and all its weapons of destruction to the bottom of the ocean immediately if the Western States agree to do likewise.

Mr. HASSAN (United Arab Republic): I should first like to welcome Mrs. Myrdal, who is again with us. We are looking forward to her usual valuable contribution to our work.

My delegation has listened with close attention to the statements that have been made recently by our colleagues in the Committee on the problem of the elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles during the disarmament process. We are happy to note that this vital question has received close attention and is the subject of a valuable and helpful discussion and exchange of views. It is evident that this subject is a particularly sensitive one for the large Powers. Nevertheless, it is equally important for the non-aligned countries and the world at large, as nuclear arms do not discriminate between large and small Powers, or between peoples on the basis of their colour or race.

A review of the discussions held so far permits us to discern three inter-dependent elements weighing heavily in favour of a reasonable solution of this problem, which if solved will pave the way to the solution of the other important problems of general and complete disarmament. These elements are as follows.

First, there is a unanimous and genuine feeling by all the people of the world that it is urgently necessary to relieve humanity once and for all, and as soon as possible, of the threat of the nuclear holocaust by the elimination of nuclear weapons.

The various factors militating in favour of such elimination on a basis of priority have been amply stated inside and outside this Committee. It is interesting to note that the most explicit and dramatic statements in this regard have come from the highest sources of the nuclear Powers themselves; they have often been quoted in our Committee, and I do not wish to take up the Committee's time by reiterating them.

It may be sufficient to emphasize that the purpose really fulfilled by the accumulation of these nuclear weapons is to keep the ominous threat of a nuclear war hovering over us. The situation will become more complicated with the continued perfecting of these weapons and with their spread to other nations.

(Mr. Hassan, United Arab Republic)

That is why world public opinion is in favour of the physical elimination, once and for all, of these destructive weapons, and that is one of the reasons why world public opinion supports the idea of general and complete disarmament, which is becoming increasingly imperative as man becomes more developed on the moral plane and more advanced technically and as his weapons become more frightful. That is also why we in the United Arab Republic have declared our support for an early legal prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons in war.

In this respect one might recall the Ethiopian resolution (A/RES/1909(XVIII); ENDC/116), which calls for study of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, and which unfortunately has not so far received in this Conference the attention due to it. I may also add that it is a matter of deep regret that, despite the fact that the General Assembly recognized in the aforementioned resolution that this subject could be speedily and effectively studied by this Conference, and despite the fact that we have been requested by the General Assembly to study it with a sense of urgency, the General Assembly's resolution has gone unheeded. We hope that this matter will be taken up seriously and very soon in this Committee.

All those evident facts lead us to a sure and objective conclusion, which is that it is urgently necessary to eliminate nuclear weapons and their means of delivery on a basis of priority.

The second element influencing the development of the problem of the elimination of nuclear weapons is the response given by both big nuclear Powers to the world-wide recognition of the need to eliminate these nuclear weapons. Their response took the form of a desire to face the problems relating to the elimination of these weapons and, in particular, their means of delivery. Their desire has been expressed officially in four different ways and on various occasions.

First, in the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations (ENDC/5) signed by the Soviet Union and the United States in September 1961 and endorsed by the resolution adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 20 December 1961 (A/RES/1660(XVI)), the two parties accepted formally, in principle, elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear, chemical, bacteriological, and other weapons of mass destruction, cessation of the

(Mr. Hassan, United Arab Republic)

production of such weapons, and elimination of all means of delivery of weapons of mass destruction.

Secondly, shortly after the Eighteen-Nation Committee began its work in March 1962 it had before it the Soviet draft treaty (ENDC/2) and the United States Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament (ENDC/30). Both draft treaties, which formed the basis for the negotiations of the Committee, proceed on the assumption that it is necessary to eliminate nuclear arms and their means of delivery, although they have different approaches to the method of eliminating these means of delivery and to some other aspects of the disarmament process.

Thirdly, this agreement in principle was further confirmed in two important documents presented to the Committee: (1) document ENDC/40/Rev.1 of 31 May 1962, prepared by the Soviet Union and the United States, containing the working draft of part I of a treaty on general and complete disarmament; and (2) document ENDC/52 of 24 July 1962, embodying the recommendations of the co-Chairmen concerning the procedure of work of our Committee on the first stage of a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

Fourthly, our Committee has been an appropriate official forum where the two sides, together with the other members of the Committee, have reiterated their basic policy for the elimination of these nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. This has been shown by the concentration on the problem of the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles and the persistent search for wider and more concrete agreements on other substantial aspects of this problem than the one achieved so far, on the matter of the principle of elimination.

By the end of the last session of this Committee one could say that the world-wide recognition of the urgent need for the elimination of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, combined with the continuous strengthening of the desire of both big nuclear Powers to eliminate the means of delivery of nuclear weapons, had paved the way for the third and decisive element affecting the problem under discussion. This third element relates to the transformation of the attitude of the two big nuclear Powers from an officially-expressed desire into a definite and concrete materialization of their will on this subject. Of course, there have been definite signs showing the will of the two parties

(Mr. Hassan, United Arab Republic)

to contain some of the aspects of the nuclear threat; I am referring to the four agreements already reached in the past two years in this respect.

We should like to believe that these peripheral agreements, together with the discussions held so far this session, have brought us a step closer to final materialization of the will of the two parties on the most important aspect of the nuclear threat -- that is, the elimination of the means of delivery of these weapons. We are greatly encouraged in this regard by two recent developments in the Committee. The first is the general tendency towards the establishment of an appropriate working group to consider concrete questions concerning the problem of the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. The second development is the general agreement that the Committee should now move from generalities to details, and that the time has come to transform the many declarations of intention on the subject into practical and concrete measures aiming at putting these declarations into effect.

Our progress in this matter seems to hinge now on mutually-acceptable terms of reference for the working group. Both parties have declared their readiness to engage in detailed discussion of practical issues in a working group, provided that no party imposes its plan as the sole basis for the terms of reference of the working group. In their search for acceptable terms of reference, members of this Committee have not failed to put forward valuable and constructive suggestions in this regard. But we are sorry to hear now from you, Mr. Chairman, that the two co-Chairmen have not yet been able to achieve any fruitful result in this regard, despite the encouraging developments which marked the outset of this session.

Desirous of joining in our colleagues' efforts in this connexion, we should like to offer some thoughts which might be of help to the Committee and to the two co-Chairmen in their coming talks on this subject, which we hope will be resumed very soon.

For our part, we believe that the activities of such a working group should cover the pertinent aspects raised in our debate concerning the problem of the elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles, including what both sides seem to agree upon -- that is, the retention of a reasonable minimum nuclear deterrent. If we take into account what has been said by the interested parties and the

(Mr. Hassan, United Arab Republic)

non-aligned nations, we may be in a position to present to the Conference a systematic formulation of the appropriate items to be referred to the working group in the form of an agreed outline of a plan for the elimination of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons. Such an outline of a plan might cover the following topics:

- (1) Reaffirmation of the principle of the elimination and cessation of production of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles;
- (2) Retention of an agreed quantity of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles which would serve the purpose of a minimum nuclear deterrent during the disarmament process; and this would entail a definition of (a) the precise purpose and aim of the retained means of delivery; (b) the kind and number of the retained means of delivery; (c) the deployment of the retained means of delivery on the territories of both sides;
- (3) The method of eliminating the means of delivery of nuclear weapons at the earliest practicable stage;
- (4) Other questions which are relevant to the problem and which would facilitate the implementation of the plan within the framework of the programme of general and complete disarmament and in accordance with the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles.

The history of disarmament is a valuable lesson in patience and sober-mindedness. Any practical, realistic disarmament plan has to take as its starting point the world as it is today. Of course, one cannot ignore that there is a perplexing problem connected with the role of science and technology in the project of world disarmament. On the one hand, its achievements have laid the basis for nuclear wars; on the other hand, it is a key for implementing and maintaining disarmament agreements. Therefore, if the two great nuclear Powers will get down to serious and detailed discussion of the question facing us, the difficulties might not be too great, especially in the light of the different suggestions presented to the Committee concerning the terms of reference of the proposed working group.

In conclusion, we find ourselves, as one of the participant States in this Committee, bound by our obligation to appeal to both sides to submit jointly to the Committee the practical and feasible measures they consider necessary for starting concrete negotiations in a working group.

(Mr. Hassan, United Arab Republic)

I should like to end by saying that we hope that the two sides will prove to be right, in our estimation, by agreeing on terms of reference that might overcome the difficulties of implementing the elimination of means of nuclear delivery. We really believe that it is not beyond the resourcefulness of the two co-Chairmen, if they have the political wish, to reach an agreement on terms of reference, bearing in mind what has already been suggested on this subject. We hope that the next co-Chairmen's report on this vital issue will be more positive.

Sir Paul MASON (United Kingdom): May I first join you, Mr. Chairman, and the speakers who have preceded me this morning, in welcoming back our Swedish colleague, Mrs. Myrdal? The United Kingdom delegation is looking forward very much to the practical and constructive contributions which she always makes to the work of the Conference.

At the outset of this morning's discussion you informed us, Mr. Chairman, that our co-Chairmen had reported that they had not yet been able to reach agreement on what, for the sake of brevity, I may perhaps describe as the "terms of reference" for the establishment of a working group on nuclear delivery vehicles; but you told us that they were continuing their efforts and that they would report to us again in the near future. I feel quite sure that all of us here will agree that in a matter so important as this our co-Chairmen should be given more time in which to pursue their task and to produce the positive results which we all desire.

In the meantime, this morning I should like to offer some comments on various points in the statement made by the representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Zorin, at our 194th meeting a fortnight ago. I should like to refer also to various points on this subject raised by other representatives at recent meetings. I do so in the hope that these comments will be taken into account by our co-Chairmen during their private discussions.

Turning first to Mr. Zorin's statement of 30 June, we in the United Kingdom delegation, like our United States colleagues, were not discouraged by it. Although we found it perhaps somewhat confusing in various respects, we were glad that Mr. Zorin kept the door open for further negotiations on the establishment of a working group. We agreed with him when he said: "Everyone recognizes the need for the establishment of such a group." (END/PV.194, p.20)

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

We were also glad to note that in his view the representatives who attempted to work out an agreed basis for this group were, as he said at the same meeting, "seeking ... in the right direction" (ibid., p.34). At the same time he gave an assurance to the Conference that our Soviet colleagues would "join in this search" and that they were not interested in "sterile work" (ibid.). That is something that we were very glad to note.

We also believe that we are correct in deducing from Mr. Zorin's statement at that meeting that our Soviet colleagues are not now asking the Committee to agree in principle to Mr. Gromyko's proposal as a pre-condition for the setting up of a working group. I am bound to say, after listening to the statement by the Bulgarian representative this morning, that I am not quite sure whether that representative entirely subscribes to that point of view. At any rate that is what we deduced from what Mr. Zorin said, and it is something which we welcome, as indeed we welcome the fact that our Soviet colleagues "do not insist that the Gromyko proposal is to be considered and accepted as a proposal" (ENDC/PV.194, provisional, p.47)<sup>1/</sup>.

Western representatives have often explained why we cannot agree in principle to a proposal which, among other things, is still unclear to us in a number of important respects. As Mr. Zorin himself acknowledged at that same meeting, Mr. Gromyko's proposal --

" ... does not contain any figures, nor does it give any concrete formulation of what is meant by a 'nuclear umbrella' in terms of its specific characteristics."

(ENDC/PV.194, p.32)

The United Kingdom delegation also noted with interest that on the same occasion Mr. Zorin specifically denied that the Gromyko proposal should be the only proposal to be considered by a working group (ibid., p.33). We find it encouraging that our Soviet colleagues have now apparently accepted the view so clearly expressed by our Nigerian, Indian and Ethiopian colleagues, among others, that the working group should, if I may quote Ambassador Imru --

" ... examine and appraise all proposals, explore the areas of agreement, and devise a realistic and practical measure acceptable to both sides."

(ibid., p.28)

---

<sup>1/</sup> These words were deleted by correction and so do not appear in the final record (p.33)

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

Still on that subject, Mr. Chairman, permit me to say that I fully agreed with you when, in your capacity as representative of Poland, you said on 7 July:

"... the acceptance of an agreed basis for the working group would enable it to consider, discuss and study all suggestions and proposals within definite terms of reference." (ENDC/PV.196, p.26)

I would call attention, if I may, to the phrase "all suggestions and proposals". I also agreed with you, Mr. Chairman, that we should be careful to ensure that the very concept of a working group should not lose its real value. In view of what I may perhaps call the reluctance with which our East European colleagues have in the past approached the question of setting up working groups, I was encouraged by your concern lest the whole idea of such groups might be compromised. I also share that concern.

However, I did not altogether follow the rest of your argument, Mr. Chairman, which implied, as I understood it, that Western delegations were proposing that the working group in question should engage in discussion on more than one issue (ibid., p.27). Clearly, much depends on what you had in mind by the phrase "one issue". If you meant that the working group should consider how to reduce and eliminate nuclear delivery vehicles from the arsenals of States during the disarmament process, then we agree with you, because here we have one issue to which, as Western delegations have already suggested, the work of the group should clearly be confined.

Having said that, however, I feel sure that you will agree with me, Mr. Chairman, that there are many aspects of this one problem, that there are various problems related to this one basic issue, that discussion of these related problems should not be precluded, and that therefore the terms of reference of the working group should not be too restrictive. But if you were arguing that you were unwilling to accept, as one of the bases for the working group's discussions, Western proposals on how to reduce and eliminate nuclear delivery vehicles, then I regret to say that I find it difficult to accept what I can only describe as a one-sided argument.

We in the West have never suggested that Western proposals should be the only basis for the establishment of the group or the only proposals to be discussed by the group. On the contrary, we have often stated that the group should consider proposals from whatever quarter they are advanced, including, in particular, proposals put forward by our Soviet colleagues. Perhaps I may remind you and the Committee of what Mr. Foster said two weeks ago, on 30 June:

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

"... we would not object if the answers to the questions which many delegations have asked about the Gromyko plan were the first matters submitted to it." (ENDC/PV.194, p.25)

It occurs to me, Mr. Chairman, that when speaking last Tuesday you may possibly have overlooked that remark of Mr. Foster's which I have just quoted and which I claim shows that, contrary to what I think you were suggesting yourself, our approach to Mr. Gromyko's proposal remains the same. We have always requested clarification and detailed discussion of that proposal; and, as Mr. Foster said, we look forward to this in a working group and, if possible, as a matter of high priority.

All the same, it is quite clear from the Committee's discussions so far that most representatives regard it as wholly unreasonable to confine the group's discussions to the proposals of one side only. We have just listened this morning to a statement by our United Arab Republic colleague which was, as is so often the case with his statements, both thoughtful and stimulating, and which I certainly wish to study carefully in the verbatim record as it deserves to be studied. I made a note of one remark he made, and I hope that I have the terms correctly. I understood Mr. Hassan to say:

"Both parties have declared their readiness to engage in a detailed discussion of practical issues in a working group, provided that no party imposes its plan as the sole basis for the terms of reference of the working group." (supra, p.16)

That, at any rate, is the position of the United Kingdom delegation.

Perhaps I may restate briefly our position in my own words. In our view, willingness to discuss and consider proposals cannot be taken to mean that participants in the group necessarily agree with those proposals. Just as our willingness to discuss the Gromyko and other relevant proposals cannot be construed as prior acceptance of those proposals, so willingness on the part of our Soviet colleagues to discuss the Western and other proposals involves no commitment by them or their Government to accept those proposals either in principle or subsequently in practice. I suggest that that is a reasonable position, and I hope my comments have helped to clarify it.

However, the Committee will recall that Mr. Zorin's statement of 30 June, which I have already quoted at length, was still not altogether free from reservations.

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

As I understood him, he asked that, as a pre-condition to the setting up of a working group, the Committee should accept in principle neither the Gromyko proposal nor the United States proposals on nuclear delivery vehicles but what he called "the substance behind the Gromyko proposal". (ENDC/PV.194, provisional, p.47)

It was at this point that we in the United Kingdom delegation were somewhat unclear about what Mr. Zorin had in mind. We have carefully studied the various passages in his recent statements in which he tried to explain to the Committee what he meant by "the substance behind the Gromyko proposal", or the Soviet version of the "nuclear umbrella" concept. Those passages are to be found, for instance, on pages 23 et-seq. of the verbatim record of our 192nd meeting, and on pages 44 - 45 and 47 of the provisional verbatim record of our 194th meeting. I cannot say that we found those passages particularly enlightening. Moreover, we noted that Mr. Zorin also said that the "substance behind the Gromyko proposal" must be examined by the working group. He told us, for example, that the group should consider what the Soviet version of the "nuclear umbrella" should be like, what its features should be, what the figures behind it should be, and matters pertaining to reduction, to control and so on (ENDC/PV.194, p.33).

I certainly agree that the working group should consider all those points; and indeed we ourselves may wish to suggest other relevant points for examination by the group. But, unless I have misunderstood them, our Soviet colleagues are in effect asking the Committee to accept in principle some sort of general and undefined concept which they themselves have outlined in only very broad terms and which, quite rightly, they want the working group to examine in detail. I suggest that the Committee cannot assess what the substance behind the Gromyko proposal is until the full details have been made available to and assessed by the working group. Only then can the Committee take a decision in principle one way or the other.

I noted that at our meeting of 30 June Mr. Zorin took issue with the leader of my delegation, Mr. Thomas, about the level of nuclear delivery vehicles which should be retained during the disarmament process (ibid., pp. 30, 31). Perhaps I should say again that I think we are all agreed that during the disarmament process nuclear delivery vehicles should be reduced --- to use the term employed by the representative of India --- "as early as practicable". (ibid., p.10) Of course, just what would be practicable in each disarmament stage is a matter for the judgement of the nuclear

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

Powers concerned, and is obviously one of the main subjects which the working group should examine. However, we do seem to be agreed that the quantity of nuclear delivery vehicles to be retained must deter all forms of aggression in all conceivable circumstances at each disarmament stage. Moreover, if I may use a quotation from something I have said myself, I did point out at the meeting of 16 June that we are also all agreed that --

"... at least somewhere towards the end of the disarmament process, both sides should have reduced the number of their nuclear delivery vehicles to a level below which they cannot be expected to fall until both sides are satisfied that their security can be guaranteed by an effective international peace-keeping force under satisfactory political control." (ENDC/PV.190, p.20)

In conclusion, I would just remind the Committee that we in the United Kingdom delegation still consider that the areas -- which I have outlined on previous occasions -- where there is in fact some common ground between the positions of both sides are sufficiently numerous to justify the setting up of a working group. Therefore we hope that our co-Chairmen will continue their efforts to agree on the basis on which such a group can be established.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): First of all, I should like to associate myself with the words of welcome which have been addressed by you, Mr. Chairman, and by other delegations to the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, whom we are glad to see again here at our Conference table.

We have listened attentively to the statement made by the representative of Bulgaria, Mr. Lukanov, and we fully agree with it. We have also listened attentively to the statement of the representative of the United Arab Republic, Mr. Hassan, and to the statement of the United Kingdom representative, Sir Paul Mason. The Soviet delegation will, of course, make a careful study of these statements, particularly the statement of Mr. Hassan, which contains a number of concrete points, and we shall make our comments on it at the first opportunity. As regards the speech made this morning by the United Kingdom representative, I hope that my statement today will provide the necessary clarity on the substance of the matter -- clarity of which the United Kingdom representative appears to be so much in need -- and that it will answer much of what has been said today by Sir Paul Mason.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

The Chairman of today's meeting, the representative of Poland, Mr. Lachs, has already informed the Committee that the co-Chairmen have not yet reached agreement on a basis for the working group, the question of the creation of which arose in connexion with the current discussion in plenary meetings of the elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles in the process of general and complete disarmament. Of course, this report cannot satisfy those who are anxious for progress in the negotiations on disarmament. The reason for the lack of progress in the discussions between the co-Chairmen is that, despite the support of a considerable majority of the Committee for the "nuclear umbrella" proposal as a basis for the solution of the problem of eliminating nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, this proposal is still encountering opposition on the part of our United States colleagues. The co-Chairmen will continue their negotiations on this question, but we do not think that the Committee's work on the subject of the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles should be held up while waiting for the conclusion of the negotiations between the co-Chairmen. On the contrary, further discussion of this question in the Committee cannot fail to be of use also for the work of the co-Chairmen, and is likely to expedite their negotiations.

Today the Soviet delegation would like to put forward some considerations in connexion with the statement made by the United States representative, Mr. Timberlake, at the 196th meeting. These considerations of ours, like Mr. Timberlake's statement, have a direct bearing on the question of an agreed basis for the functions of the working group.

We have examined that part of Mr. Timberlake's statement in which he gave his evaluation of the level of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles possessed by the United States at the present time. This question, as you remember, arose in connexion with the view expressed at the meeting on 30 June by the representative of India, Mr. Nehru, that the present level --

"... has clearly passed the danger point and is very much above the minimum level needed for genuine security or for deterrence".

(ENDC/PV.194, p.9)

Mr. Nehru went on to say:

"If we are living under a nuclear sword which can fall on us at any moment, can it be said that we have conditions of security? It

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

seems that such security as a true deterrent may be expected to provide has been compromised by this expanding level". (ibid.)

This view seems to us extremely interesting and important, and is evidently shared by many participants in our negotiations. In any case, we should like to point out that a similar point of view has been expressed by a number of representatives, including the representative of Mexico, Mr. Robledo, who stated on 7 July:

"We likewise see that a solution to this problem [of the elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles] is more than ever a matter of urgency, since nuclear weapons have reached a level which without exaggeration can be called terrifying -- a level which, to quote from the Indian representative's speech on 30 June '... is very much above the minimum level needed for genuine security or for deterrence' (ENDC/PV.194, p.9)". (ENDC/PV.196, p.5)

Even the representative of one of the Western Powers, Mr. Burns, the representative of Canada, also referred to this aspect of the matter. At the meeting of 7 July he said:

"We are all aware of the dangers and costs created by the existing state of affairs, the existing scale of deterrence, which perhaps we might call a maximum deterrent". (ibid., p.18)

As you see from the statements I have quoted, it is evident that everyone in the Committee considers the existing level of nuclear weapons to be exceedingly high and dangerous. Only the delegation of the United States has a dissenting opinion and insists that the present level of delivery vehicles possessed by the United States not only is not excessive but even needs to be further increased. Thus at the meeting of 30 June Mr. Foster stated on this score literally the following:

"... we do not consider that the present levels of nuclear vehicles possessed by the United States are in excess of what we need under the present circumstances". (ENDC/PV.194, p.24)

On 7 July Mr. Timberlake developed this thesis further. At first he observed that the United States, while recognizing the danger of nuclear weapons, did not agree at all that "the existing level of deterrence is excessive for its purposes" (ENDC/PV.196, pp.23, 24). Then Mr. Timberlake declared that the United States

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

intended to "refine" nuclear weapons and to "retain" them at their present level --

"... until we have been able to agree on a safeguarded, balanced method of reducing these arsenals". (ibid.)

We may be told that it is the business of the United States itself to make an evaluation of its armaments and to determine whether they need to be reduced or increased. But we consider that in disarmament negotiations delegations cannot disregard this aspect of the matter, because it is directly linked with disarmament.

The United States Government considers that the arsenal of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles which it possesses at the present time is a minimum, and it intends to improve and increase this arsenal regardless of the danger to the cause of peace entailed in the very fact of the accumulation by States of gigantic stockpiles of devastating nuclear weapons. What does all this mean? Let us turn to the facts, to actual things, to the official data on the size of the United States nuclear arsenal. Let us take a look at what is happening in practice.

Speaking on 3 June 1964 at the Coast Guard Academy in New London, Connecticut, the United States President, Mr. Johnson, declared that the United States now had more than 1,000 fully armed ICBMs and Polaris missiles, as well as more than 1,100 strategic bombers equipped with nuclear missiles. The United States President went on to say: "Against such force the combined destructive power of every battle ever fought by man is like a firecracker thrown against the sun." Obviously there can be no more authoritative information on the size of the United States nuclear arsenal. Those figures are completely reliable. Let us now put this to the test; let us take a look at their significance from the point of view of life and death on our planet.

According to data of the well-known United States scientist and Nobel Prize winner, Dr. Linus Pauling, during the Second World War from 1939 to 1945 the explosives used by all the countries engaged in the war had a total power of six megatons. The use of these explosives caused the deaths of about 40 million people in the years of the Second World War. Yet the United States President, Mr. Johnson, has said that the present United States arsenal of strategic delivery vehicles is so great that the combined destructive power of every battle ever fought by man is

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

like a firecracker in comparison with what the United States now has at its disposal. This graphic comparison shows that at the present time the United States nuclear arsenal, speaking in terms of statistics, has such potential power that it would suffice to destroy tens of milliards of people. Of course, this estimation is to some extent a relative one, but it clearly shows how great would be the number of victims if the United States used its nuclear arsenal and if there were so many people in the world. But as yet the population of our planet amounts to only 350,000 million.

However, as Mr. Foster and Mr. Timberlake have told us, the potential of this nuclear arsenal is considered by the United States Government insufficient; it intends to increase it. In fact, in the statement on the defence programme for the 1965-1969 fiscal years (that is, for the next five years) and the 1965 defence budget, made by the United States Secretary of Defense, Mr. McNamara, on 27 January this year before the United States Congress, it is pointed out that by January 1965 the United States expects to add to its present intercontinental missiles another 200 Minuteman missiles, besides producing 15 modernized Minuteman II missiles, and to increase the Polaris force from the 144 missiles in combat readiness in the summer of last year to 656 missiles which will be completely ready for operational deployment within three years. This means that the means have already been planned for delivering further hundreds of megatons of nuclear death.

Of course, no one can agree with the assertions by Mr. Foster and Mr. Timberlake that all this is a minimum which barely covers the national security requirements of the United States or still does not even cover them. And they talk about a minimum! In current United States political language, there is a quite different, and very accurate, name for this minimum: "over-kill"; that is, the destruction of every living creature many times over -- I stress, many times over. And this they try to represent to us as a minimum requirement of United States national security!

It may be asked, however, what bearing, strictly speaking, has the question of whether the present level of the United States nuclear arsenal exceeds or does not exceed the national security requirements of the United States on the

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

problem of disarmament, with which we are dealing here in the Committee; since disarmament provides for the elimination of all nuclear arsenals, including that of the United States. The answer to this question is quite simple: basing itself on the "over-kill" concept in measures to increase its military strength at a time when there is still no agreement on disarmament, the United States side has introduced this same "over-kill" concept into its approach, into its disarmament proposals, particularly into its proposals for the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. The gist of these proposals is the retention by the nuclear Powers, almost up to the last day of disarmament, of the "over-kill" capacity. This can easily be confirmed by referring to the examples used by the United States representatives themselves.

Even if we assume that the disarmament process would begin with the present level of delivery vehicles, it would turn out that after their reduction, under the United States plan, by 30 per cent in the first stage of disarmament, by the beginning of the second stage the United States would still have about 700 intercontinental missiles and Polaris missiles and 770 strategic bombers. This means that at the beginning of the second stage of disarmament the United States would still possess sufficient nuclear power to wipe out the whole of mankind many times over. Obviously similar nuclear power would be retained by the other side, too. That is the sort of disarmament that is being suggested to us.

But what would happen by the beginning of the third stage if the United States plan were to be implemented? By the beginning of the third stage the United States would still have 350 intercontinental missiles and about 400 strategic bombers, which means the capacity to destroy everything living on our planet at least once, if not more. And this is envisaged for the final concluding stage of disarmament.

That is what we are being asked to discuss in a working group. That is the basis, deriving from the "over-kill" concept, on which it is proposed to work out a practical programme for the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. And even discontent is expressed and an air of unjust offence is put on when we say that it is useless and senseless to discuss the "over-kill" concept in the working group because on that basis it would be impossible to work out any acceptable disarmament programme.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

Our concept is different. Of course, as everyone knows, the Soviet Union also possesses considerable stockpiles of strategic nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, sufficient for dealing an overwhelming, devastating blow at any aggressor who had unleashed a war against our country and other socialist States. But our concept is that we propose to destroy all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in the very first stage of general and complete disarmament, and to start disarmament with their destruction. In that way, and only in that way, can genuine security for everyone be ensured in the disarmament process. There is no other possibility, no other alternative.

It is true that in meeting the wishes of the Western Powers, which had voiced fears for their security in the event of the total elimination of delivery vehicles in the first stage, we expressed our readiness to agree to the retention by the Soviet Union and the United States, up to the end of the disarmament process, of an agreed, strictly limited quantity of intercontinental missiles, anti-aircraft missiles in the ground-to-air category and anti-missile missiles together with their nuclear warheads -- that is, the retention by each side of what we call here the "nuclear umbrella" (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1). In other words, we agreed to make a certain exception to the principle of the total elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in the first stage, although we considered those fears of the Western Powers, which are based on a purely hypothetical situation, utterly groundless.

We consider that it would have been possible not to make such an exception. Nevertheless, we are prepared to agree to this exception on the explicit understanding that such an exception cannot comprise anything even remotely recalling the "over-kill" concept. In the "nuclear umbrella", which is to exist in the conditions of the implementation of general and complete disarmament, and not in the present conditions of the arms race, there can only be a strictly limited, agreed quantity of missiles -- as many missiles and of such power as would be sufficient to deter any aggressor beforehand, but not so many missiles as to make it possible to unleash a nuclear war. Here it is necessary to show particular caution and to be particularly circumspect.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

The "nuclear umbrella" proposal is a compromise, but a compromise based not on the abandonment of the principle of the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in the first stage; it is a compromise in no way aimed at finding ways of getting closer to the "over-kill" concept. It is altogether impossible to fit this concept -- the "over-kill" concept -- into the framework of disarmament; it contradicts the very idea of disarmament.

The preparation of appropriate concrete recommendations on the "nuclear umbrella", its composition, its strength, the distribution of the missiles comprised in it, the control over them, the order of their elimination in the third stage of disarmament -- all these are questions which could be dealt with by a working group. Such a working group is worth setting up; it could be useful for our purpose. But to enable it to be set up, the Western Powers must at least agree to the principle itself of the "nuclear umbrella" as a realistic basis for the activities of the working group. That is the crux of the matter.

I should like to make another small remark. In their statements many representatives have referred to the favourable atmosphere in the Committee. As is well known, we have always been advocates of a businesslike atmosphere in the negotiations and, in this connexion, we should certainly like the favourable atmosphere in the Committee to continue in the future. But a good atmosphere by itself, without practical results, without progress in the negotiations, without any movement forward, is no better than a ploughed field in which the ploughman has not sown any seeds, and where consequently no wheat grows. The peoples, millions of people, need practical fruits from our negotiations; that is the important thing to them, not whether we are smiling at each other or shooting poisoned arrows across the table.

While no such practical results are forthcoming, people in the whole world are filled with anxiety. Only a few days ago, the All-Indian Peace Council in its message to our Conference -- I think that the other Committee members have received this message -- expressed its regret at the lack of progress in the negotiations in the Committee and stressed that the people of India ardently desired the Committee to reach an agreement on general and complete disarmament without any further delay. Similar messages are reaching the Committee from other countries, from other organizations, from all corners of the world.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

The Soviet delegation is convinced that already at this session of the Committee we can and must achieve positive results on the question of general and complete disarmament, if we begin by approving in principle the concept of the "nuclear umbrella" and establish a working group to study and work out all the practical questions and details deriving from this concept. Whether such a working group will be set up, whether consequently progress will be achieved in the negotiations, depends now on our Western colleagues, on them alone, and above all on the United States.

Mr. OBI (Nigeria): I have asked for the floor merely to make a few brief comments on the report of our co-Chairmen, which was read out at the beginning of this morning's meeting, regarding the setting up of an appropriate working organ. Before doing so, I should like to extend a most hearty welcome to Mrs. Myrdal. We have always attached the highest value to the wise contributions of our colleague from Sweden, and we are happy that her other commitments have at last permitted her to return to our midst.

My delegation was ready to offer congratulations to our hard-working co-Chairmen for agreeing on the terms of reference for and the establishment of a working organ to consider the manner of elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles at the earliest possible time. Therefore we are understandably disappointed -- indeed very much disappointed -- at being deprived of the real pleasure of congratulating our co-Chairmen.

However, my delegation is pleased that the co-Chairmen will still continue the search for an accord on this question. As the Committee is aware, the Nigerian delegation attaches the utmost importance to this question, and the failure of the co-Chairmen to reach agreement causes us concern. Therefore we sincerely trust that they will report agreement at an early date. We honestly do not see why that should not be so, given the necessary goodwill, which we thought was not lacking. However, if the co-Chairmen cannot submit a positive report at an early date, perhaps they would consider the advisability of bringing into their somewhat exclusive club some other members of the Committee to assist them. We have had precedents for that, in connexion with drafting certain articles of our treaty on general and complete disarmament and in regard to a collateral measure. The results of such extended co-Chairmen's meetings were, if I remember correctly, not altogether unproductive.

(Mr. Obi, Nigeria)

At any rate my delegation trusts that even in the restricted bilateral negotiations between the co-Chairmen the views of the other delegations are taken into account. I trust, therefore, that there is no need to draw their attention to the compromise formula submitted by my delegation on 23 June. I refer to the formula which requires --

"... the acceptance of the concept of a 'nuclear umbrella' at the earliest possible point in the disarmament process, to be eliminated at the end of the disarmament process, coupled with a firm undertaking to eliminate all other means of delivery of nuclear weapons at the earliest possible time" (ENDC/PV.192, p.19).

My delegation is indeed gratified at the good reception accorded that proposal from all sides of the Committee. We are also gratified at the promise by the delegations primarily concerned to give the formula the closest study. Needless to say, we remain convinced of the validity of our formula. Indeed, it is one which we tried to work out with great care and one which, if given the study it deserves, should be found to meet the demands of both sides. However, we are not wedded to any particular choice of words -- least of all to any which, for one reason or another, have acquired such colouring as to make them partially or wholly unacceptable to one side or the other.

To facilitate the work of the co-Chairmen and the Committee --- and once more invoking a precedent which was adopted when preparing a working draft for the preamble and first article of our treaty on general and complete disarmament and also in regard to one of the collateral measures --- my delegation would like to submit a practical proposal which we hereby request the Secretariat to circulate as an official document of the Committee<sup>1/</sup>. The proposal is a simple one, stemming more or less from our earlier formula. It is as follows:

"The retention by both nuclear sides, from the earliest possible point in the disarmament process, of an agreed quantity of nuclear delivery vehicles, the minimum sufficient to provide reasonable guarantees during the process of disarmament, to be eliminated at the end of the disarmament process, and the elimination of all other means of delivering nuclear weapons at the earliest possible and practicable time, in accordance with the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles".

---

<sup>1/</sup> Circulated as document ENDC/136

(Mr. Obi, Nigeria)

We commend that working draft to the Committee, and in particular to the co-Chairmen, in the hope that it will help to clear the way for the establishment of a working organ which we are all anxious to see established without unnecessary delay.

Mr. BURNS (Canada): As other representatives who preceded me have done, I should like to welcome back Mrs. Myrdal to our deliberations here. It always seems to the Canadian delegation that our proceedings take on a slightly more hopeful tone when she is here, and we hope she will be able to remain with us until we have accomplished something definite or are on the way to doing so.

I wish to make a few comments on the position in which we find ourselves at the present time and the difficulties which the co-Chairmen are experiencing in reaching agreement on the terms of reference for a working group. Useful statements on the position were heard from the representatives of Bulgaria, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. However, I wish first to speak on the very interesting statement made by the representative of the United Arab Republic, Mr. Hassan. I was particularly struck by the following remark which he made:

"Both parties have declared their readiness to engage in detailed discussion of practical issues in a working group, provided that no party imposes its plan as the sole basis for the terms of reference of the working group." (supra, p.16)

That was what was said by Mr. Hassan this morning. It seems to me, with all respect to him, that, although this is much to be desired if it were true, it is not entirely so. I repeat: "provided that no party imposes its plan as the sole basis for the terms of reference of the working group". I submit that that, in fact, is what the Soviet Union and the other socialist delegations are wishing to do. They wish to impose their plan -- the elimination of all nuclear weapon vehicles in the first stage, with the exception of the limited number provided under the Gromyko proposal (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1) -- and that is to be the only proposal under discussion in the working group. The Soviet Union's insistence on the Gromyko "nuclear umbrella" plan to the exclusion of any other plan is preventing agreement on the setting up of a working group.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

It was not only the representative of the United Arab Republic who indicated that readiness to discuss the plans of both sides was essential for arriving at agreement on the terms of reference of the working group. The representative of India, who spoke on 30 June, said the same thing (ENDC/PV.194, p.11). If I understand rightly the proposal which has just been submitted by the representative of Nigeria (ENDC/136), it also would provide for discussion of the plans of both sides.

This morning we have heard the Soviet representative, Mr. Tsarapkin, explain why in his view it would not be possible for the working group to discuss the United States plan (ENDC/30 and Corr.1 and Add.1, 2, 3), which is subscribed to by the other Western countries, for the reduction of the present nuclear deterrent by percentages throughout each stage. I have explained previously (ENDC/PV.196, p.19) that it would not be impossible to change by negotiation the percentages mentioned in the United States plan.

Mr. Tsarapkin chose to state that the United States proposed to increase its already very considerable deterrent. But I should like to put before the Committee the fact that the United States has proposed -- this was put forward by President Johnson last January when we started our deliberations (ENDC/120) -- that the arms race should be "frozen" by stopping the further production of all intercontinental nuclear vehicles. We have had no response -- no affirmative response, at any rate -- to that proposal from the Soviet Union, which apparently wishes to go on with the arms race in that respect. Therefore I do not think the charge that the United States is insisting on increasing its store of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles can be sustained, in view of that proposal which was put forward. Thus, if the United States is increasing its deterrent force, it is doing so because the arms race is going on and because the Soviet Union is presumably increasing its deterrent capacity or its means of nuclear destruction at the same time.

We have heard the representative of the Soviet Union talk to us about what he calls the "overkill" concept, alleging that the whole idea of nuclear deterrence, as formulated by the United States, is based on the idea that it is necessary to be able to kill everything on earth several times over. I do not think that that sort of exaggeration is likely to impress this Committee greatly; it is not really helpful in the consideration of the problem before us -- that is, to determine how we can proceed to work out in detail the methods which could be used to reduce, and finally to eliminate, the nuclear weapon vehicles.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

One can prove almost anything by statistics if one wishes to do so. I am reminded at this time -- hearing what possibilities for destruction there are in both sides' nuclear stockpiles -- of the famous example which is often given by the opponents of chemical warfare. We have been told that one spoonful of the toxin which is produced by the botulism organism would be sufficient to poison everyone on earth. No doubt that is correct. But how are you going to give it to everybody on earth? I think that calculations of the available nuclear explosive power, and what it could do to everybody if it was thoroughly distributed all over the earth, are not really relevant to our problem.

I think we all agree that we wish to see the means of delivery of nuclear weapons reduced and that we wish a working group to be set up, with practicable terms of reference, to discuss how this can be done. In the view of the Canadian delegation, this will not be achieved while one side insists that only its own ideas will be discussed in the working group and refuses to discuss those of the other party.

Mr. PECHOTA (Czechoslovakia) (translation from Russian): Permit me first of all, Mr. Chairman, to associate myself with you and with all the previous speakers who have welcomed to our midst the leader of the Swedish delegation, Mrs. Myrdal. I should like to wish her all success in her work in our Committee.

At the beginning of today's meeting you acquainted us with the report of the co-Chairmen of the Conference. We regret, of course, that our co-Chairmen have not yet been able to reach agreement, but we express the hope that we shall receive more encouraging information in the near future. During the last four weeks many delegations have made considerable efforts to bridge the gap that still separates us from agreement in determining the terms of reference of the working group, the establishment of which was suggested by Mr. Zorin at our meeting of 9 June (ENDC/PV.188, p.17). The lead-giving ideas which accompanied that proposal do not appear so far to have fallen on fertile soil. Our Western colleagues, despite their assurances of good will, have not yet displayed the necessary flexibility in this regard. However, the Soviet Union's proposal has undoubtedly helped to crystallize opinions in our Committee and has brought about a chain reaction of attempts to find an appropriate solution.

(Mr. Pechota, Czechoslovakia)

This is shown by the statements of our colleagues the representatives of India, Nigeria, Ethiopia and Mexico, at the last three meetings. Their active approach to the solution of the problem and their sincere desire to contribute to the search for an acceptable basis undoubtedly constitute a positive beginning in our negotiations. We have carefully studied the considerations which Mr. Nehru put before us on 30 June (ENDC/PV.194, pp.6 et seq.) We believe that the ideas he put forward are in the right direction and, if further elaborated, might bring us nearer to agreement. In our opinion, their further elaboration should consist in determining more explicit directives which would ensure businesslike discussions in the working group. An agreement on the terms of reference should ensure that the group would direct its attention to working out such a method of eliminating nuclear weapon delivery vehicles as would make this measure effective and realistic. This basic criterion is contained precisely in the principle of the "nuclear umbrella" or a minimum deterrent.

Today we have listened with great attention to the very constructive and interesting statement made by the representative of the United Arab Republic Mr. Hassan, which deserves to be very carefully studied by the members of the Committee. We shall certainly study his arguments with all due attention, and we shall not fail to state our attitude towards them at subsequent meetings. We shall also study carefully the proposal put forward this morning by the representative of Nigeria, Mr. Obi (ENDC/136).

It is perfectly normal that the discussion which has taken place so far on the proposal to set up a working group should have been concerned in the main with the approach to the problem of eliminating nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, the key problem of general and complete disarmament. The discussion has provided convincing evidence that, without a radical and at the same time realistic approach to this problem, it is impossible to overcome the climax in the negotiations on general and complete disarmament.

We do not intend to enlarge our statement today with a long polemic on all the views with which we are unable to agree and the repetition of which merely brings us back to the initial stage of our negotiations. Such views have been expressed on many occasions in the statements made by our Western colleagues,

(Mr. Pechota, Czechoslovakia)

but there are some among them which we cannot disregard. This applies, for instance, to the statement made by the representative of the United States, Mr. Timberlake, on 7 July concerning the United States interpretation of the concept of a minimum deterrent, which has been referred to this morning in the statements made by the representative of Bulgaria, Mr. Iukanov, and the representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Tsarapkin. Here is what Mr. Timberlake said in his recent statement:

"... the level of deterrence depends on existing conditions. Under present conditions each State has made its own determination of its necessary deterrent. In the case of the United States that deterrent represents the minimum necessary for its security. The number of nuclear delivery vehicles may seem too high to some. But our security requirements and the existing military balance are not determined by numbers alone." (ENDC/PV.196, p.25)

In that statement, if one draws from it a direct conclusion for the present discussion of the question of the terms of reference of the working group, there stands out very clearly a contradiction in regard to the basic question which determines the approach to the problem of eliminating nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. As is well known, the proposal of the Soviet Union for the retention of a "nuclear umbrella" (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1) is based on the fact that the means already accumulated for waging a nuclear war have reached enormous proportions and constitute a constant danger of a nuclear conflagration, and that for this reason they must be eliminated at the earliest stage of disarmament, while leaving in the armaments of the nuclear Powers a minimum, strictly limited and agreed quantity of delivery vehicles necessary for guaranteeing the security of States during the disarmament process.

In contrast to this, the United States concept of a minimum deterrent is based on the idea of retaining an enormous quantity of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. It cannot be doubted that, starting from the concept of a minimum, as understood by the United States -- if we are to judge from the words of the United States representative, Mr. Timberlake -- it is extremely difficult to come to an agreement which would entail a substantial reduction of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles and thus eliminate the danger of nuclear aggression. Indeed, this concept introduces into the disarmament negotiations an element which, in our opinion, is the very negation of the aims of general and complete disarmament.

(Mr. Pechota, Czechoslovakia)

The question arises of how fruitful the disarmament negotiations are likely to be if the United States considers its present enormous stockpiles of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles to be the minimum necessary to safeguard its own security. We believe that in this regard the views of the overwhelming majority of the representatives in the Committee are diametrically opposed to those of the United States representative. We venture to hope that the position adopted by our United States colleague on the fundamental question of the level of deterrence will not be the last word of his delegation. We also trust that he will regard our remarks as the expression of our desire to clarify to the greatest possible extent the situation now obtaining in our negotiations.

The concept underlying the present proposals (ENDC/12C; PV.191, pp. 6 et seq.) for the solution of the problem of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles which the United States has submitted under item 5(b) of the agreement on procedure (ENDC/52) is obviously unrealistic. Thus to base the discussions in the working group on criteria which have not been clearly defined would be tantamount to repeating in the group the sterile discussion on the basic concepts of nuclear disarmament which has been going on for so long in the Committee. The fact that the interpretation given by the Western Powers to the aims and nature of the discussion in the working group differs from the interpretation given to them by the majority of the members of the Committee is shown by the characteristic statement made by the representative of Italy, Mr. Cavalletti, on 7 July. In stating his views of the tasks of the working group, Mr. Cavalletti emphasized that ---

"There are thus three kinds of problems to study first, the progressive reduction of the number of delivery vehicles, while maintaining a general balance; secondly, the application of adequate guarantees as to control; thirdly, the progressive establishment within the framework of the United Nations of a collective security system, simultaneously with the destruction of armaments." (ENDC/PV.196, p.13)

Mr. Cavalletti obviously avoids taking a clear position on the fundamental problem, namely the adoption of the "nuclear umbrella" principle.

(Mr. Pechota, Czechoslovakia)

Moreover, the whole of the problems which, in his opinion, should be dealt with in the working group includes such a highly complicated political and legal problem as that of collective security machinery. We consider it very arbitrary to combine at the present time the problem of collective security with the problem of the elimination of delivery vehicles. There can be no doubt that the question of collective security is linked to the solution of the whole problem of general and complete disarmament, and not to one aspect alone, even if it is a key aspect.

The intrinsic logic itself of the argumentation of our Western colleagues leads inevitably to a definite conclusion. At any rate it seems to us that their proposals, if accepted, would doom a working group with such broad tasks to become a dead backwater into which it would be possible to divert our negotiations from the main channel and hide for a long time one of the most important problems of general and complete disarmament. And all this precisely at a time when, thanks to the realistic and concrete proposals of the socialist countries, possibilities of achieving progress on this key problem have begun to emerge.

Such an orientation of the activities of the working group does not correspond with our views. Nor does it correspond, I think, with the views of the majority of the members of the Committee. What we want is that, thanks to the establishment of a working group, there should begin, as Mr. Zorin stated on 16 June --

"... a new and very promising stage .. the stage of working out, on the basis of an agreement in principle, military and scientific parameters for the solution of one of the cardinal questions of the general and complete disarmament programme." (ENDC/PV.190, pp.33,34)

The Czechoslovak delegation firmly supports the proposal for the establishment of a working group with clearly-defined directives. We consider that the most suitable basis for the activities of this group is the principle of a "nuclear umbrella" or minimum deterrent, on which the proposal put forward by the delegation of the Soviet Union is based. We are convinced that the adoption of this basis, which does not, however, exclude any reasonable and effective proposals aimed at eliminating the danger of nuclear war, would create real possibilities of achieving progress in our negotiations.

(Mr. Pechota, Czechoslovakia)

As I said at the beginning of my statement, it is to be regretted that our co-Chairmen have not yet succeeded in reaching agreement on such a realistic basis for the activities of the working group. We consider that they should continue their negotiations; perhaps it would be appropriate if the representatives of some other delegations took part in these negotiations, particularly of those which, in submitting their ideas and proposals for determining the terms of reference of the working group, showed their desire to seek for a mutually-acceptable basis for an agreement in this regard.

Mr. TIMBERLAKE (United States of America): First I should like to join the other representatives who have welcomed Mrs. Myrdal, of whose work in this Conference I have heard so much, although I myself have not previously had the privilege of serving here with her.

I have listened with great interest this morning to the interventions of our colleagues, and especially to the suggestions of the representatives of the United Arab Republic and Nigeria. I shall study them closely, of course, for their contribution to the resolution of the problem now before us. This problem has all the importance which was so well re-emphasized by the representative of the United Arab Republic. I would also heartily endorse the statement made this morning by the representative of the United Kingdom, and the remarks of the representative of Canada.

I shall reply at some future date to the remarks regarding "over-kill" or excessive levels of deterrents made by the representative of the Soviet Union and echoed in part by the representative of Czechoslovakia. For the moment I shall state simply that we do not agree with either the arguments or the conclusions in those statements.

As far as the working group is concerned, we continue to believe that it would provide a useful forum in which to get on with the solution of the problem of reducing and eliminating nuclear delivery vehicles. I am still hopeful that we can make progress in that direction.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): In his statement today the representative of Canada, Mr. Burns, reproached me with having indulged in an exaggeration in my statement this morning. But, Mr. Burns, everything we stated was based on data published in the United States itself and supplied by responsible United States leaders. We referred to these data solely in order to show that, if the Western Powers' approach to disarmament is applied, disarmament will turn out to be such that the "over-kill" capacity and the possibility of a nuclear war will be maintained up to the very last stage of disarmament. Whether Mr. Burns likes it or not, this assessment of the United States proposal for a percentage reduction of delivery vehicles by stages of disarmament is absolutely correct; it does not contain any exaggerations, because it is based solely on factual data and therefore cannot be refuted.

For his part, the representative of Canada, just like other Western representatives, is trying to replace the important question of principle concerning the basis for the activities of the working group with another question. The question of the basis for the activities of the working group has been raised in the Committee. It has been urged in the Committee that agreement should be reached on the basis for the activities of the working group, on such a basis as would provide for the retention by nuclear sides of only a minimum, strictly limited quantity of missiles, and that immediately after such agreement the working group should begin to study all the practical questions and details relating to the "nuclear umbrella". It is a question of the principle, Mr. Burns, There can only be one principle, common to all, to you and to us.

This question cannot be passed on to the working group for study; the latter cannot be entrusted with the study of the question of what principle its work is to be based upon. Otherwise it will be a continuation of the same discussion as that which we are having here in the Committee. To give such instructions to the working group would be tantamount to dooming the activities of the working group to complete failure in advance. Therefore we firmly reject as completely unfounded such a way

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

of stating the question as that indulged in by Mr. Burns when he says that the Soviet delegation wants the working group to consider only the Soviet Union's proposal and no other proposals.

That assertion of yours is essentially wrong, Mr. Burns. After we have reached agreement here between us in regard to the principle of the basis for the activities of the working group, on the question of the "nuclear umbrella", the working group will have to consider all proposals which, after being submitted, will be passed on to that group and which relate to its study of the practical questions and details involved in the implementation of the agreed principle, namely the "nuclear umbrella". We have already explained this to you, and we cannot understand why you keep reverting to such an incorrect interpretation of the position of the Soviet Union. As regards the principle of the activities of the working group, there can only be one, either the principle of a "nuclear umbrella" or the principle of a percentage reduction. Here we have two principles; one of them must be chosen.

Discussion of specific questions in the working group on the basis of the two principles cannot lead to any concrete results. It is necessary to choose one principle, one basis. The majority is in favour of choosing such a principle as would preclude the possibility of having in the disarmament process a situation where it would be possible to unleash a thermonuclear war at any stage of disarmament, in the first, the second, or the third; and that is precisely what the United States proposals would lead to. Consequently it is a question of choosing the principle which is to be made the basis of the activities of the working group.

In conclusion, I should like to say that we shall also study with all possible care and attention the suggestions put forward today by the representative of Nigeria, Mr. Obi, on the question of the basis for the activities of the working group.

The CHAIRMAN (Poland): I should like to say a few words in my capacity as the representative of Poland.

(The Chairman, Poland)

This morning the representative of the United Kingdom honoured me by quoting extensively from the statement I made on Tuesday last, at the 196th meeting. I did not want to abuse my functions as your Chairman for today, and so I did not reply immediately to what he said; but I should like to do so now. I suggest that Sir Paul Mason stretched the meaning of my words to make them read in a way that was not intended; nor, I submit, do they justify such a reading. At one point particularly, he stressed the first part of the sentence without giving due consideration to the second part. He seems to have disregarded Bacon's famous maxim "Noscitur a sociis", the necessity of taking the text as a whole.

In quoting my statement he only slightly opened the door to another reading which was, in fact, the real meaning of the text. I should have preferred Sir Paul Mason to open the door more widely and to join me in what was the plain meaning of the words and the objective of my statement. But, even in doing what he did, he seemed to concede that there was some value in what I said. Therefore I shall not abandon hope that the United Kingdom delegation will continue on this path in order to help in reaching an agreement on the terms of reference for the proposed working group, so that it will discuss one subject, and one subject only, but all proposals relating to that subject, on the basis so clearly and convincingly presented this morning by the representative of the Soviet Union.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 198th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the Chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador Manfred Lachs, representative of Poland.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Bulgaria, the United Arab Republic, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, Nigeria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, the United States and Poland.

"The delegation of Nigeria tabled a working document connected with the problem of nuclear delivery vehicles.<sup>1/</sup>

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 16 July 1964, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 1.5 p.m.

